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Patching the Patchwork Quilt: "Reforming" the
Medicaid Program-The Medicaid Voluntary
Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax
Amendments of 1991
Michael 0. Spivey*
Last November, Congress passed arguably the most significant
modifications to the Medicaid program since that program's incep-
tion in 1965. The legislation grew out of a dispute between the
states and the federal government over the manner in which states
fund their portion of the Medicaid program. The new law, the
Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax
Amendments of 1991 ("the Act"), 1 places restrictions on states'
sources of funding for the non-federal share of Medicaid expendi-
tures, caps payments to hospitals serving large numbers of Medi-
caid and low-income patients (so-called disproportionate share
hospitals), and radically alters the relationship between the states
and the federal government. This article will review the circum-
stances leading up to this important legislation, examine the provi-
sions of the Act, discuss the many unanswered questions the
legislation poses, and reach the conclusion that the legislation fails
to address the structural problems that led to the dispute between
the states and the federal government.
STATES FIND NEW SOURCES OF MEDICAID FUNDING
Congress enacted Medicaid 2 Title XIX of the Social Security
Act in 1965 to insure access to health care by the poor. Under the
terms of participation in Medicaid, states make expenditures to
furnish medical assistance to needy individuals, and the federal
government reimburses the states for a portion of this cost. The
* Mr. Spivey is an attorney with the law firm of Powell, Goldstein, Grazer & Mur-
phey in Washington, D.C. In his practice, he represents the National Association of
Public Hospitals, lobbies extensively on the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Pro-
vider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, and assists hospitals in over a dozen states with
respect to Medicaid reimbursement issues.
1. Pub. L. No. 102-234, 105 Stat. 1793 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1396a & 1396b) [hereinafter "the Act"].
2. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 343 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A.).
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federal government pays between 50 and 83 percent of states' ac-
tual costs in providing care to the indigent. (The exact percentage
depends upon a state's per capita income.) State and local govern-
ments pay the rest. The federal contribution is known as "federal
financial participation" or "FFP."
In what was later to become an ironic twist, the Health Care
Financing Administration ("HCFA"), the agency responsible for
administering the Medicaid program, created the circumstances
that led to the eventual passage of last year's legislation. On No-
vember 12, 1985, HCFA adopted final regulations that specify
which fund sources would be considered state fund sources for pur-
poses of determining federal matching payments.4 Prior to the fi-
nal rule, HCFA had allowed states to finance their share of
training expenditures through donations to the Medicaid program
from hospitals and other providers of health care. Provider dona-
tions, however, could not fund other Medicaid expenditures. The
November 12, 1985, rule revised this restriction "to permit public
and private donations to be used as a State's share of financial par-
ticipation in the entire Medicaid program."5 States were now un-
constrained in their utilization of provider donations; they lost
little time in taking advantage of the more lenient HCFA policy to
relieve the increasingly heavy burden of financing their Medicaid
programs. This led immediately to controversy and litigation.
In the fall of 1986, the State of West Virginia found itself in a
precarious budgetary situation. Facing approximately $44 million
in unpaid claims by West Virginia hospitals for services rendered
to Medicaid beneficiaries, state officials met with hospital repre-
sentatives to seek a way out of the budget crisis. At some point in
these discussions, it was suggested that the hospitals donate funds
to the state's Indigent Care Fund. State officials explained that
these donations would be matched with federal dollars, and the
funds then would be distributed to the hospitals. In November,
1986, hospitals began making donations, which, according to
HCFA, were "based on each hospital's level of outstanding net
Medicaid receivables." ' 6 By the end of January, 1987, 62 hospitals
in West Virginia had contributed approximately $22 million to the
Indigent Care Fund, which was used to generate over $60 million
3. These payments are referred to as the non-federal share or, not quite accurately,
the state share.
4. 50 Fed. Reg. 46,652 (1985) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 432 (1990)).
5. Id.
6. Docket Nos. 87-64 and 87-126, Decision No. 956 (H.H.S. Departmental Grant
Appeals Board, W. Va. Department, May 19, 1988).
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in federal matching payments. The following year, HCFA issued
two separate disallowances totaling almost $60 million. HCFA
concluded that the hospital donations failed to "meet the regula-
tory definition of donated funds which may constitute the state
share eligible for federal matching.'
The State of West Virginia appealed the disallowances first to
the Grant Appeals Board ("GAB") of the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") and, ultimately, to the federal court.
The GAB agreed with HCFA that the transferred funds did not
qualify as donations since the funds had not been "donated under
the commonly accepted meaning of the term,"8 concluding that the
donations operated as a "discount in claims." The GAB reduced
the claims by the $22 million in donations and recalculated the
federal matching payments, upholding $16 million of the
disallowance.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia reversed the Board's finding, concluding that in ap-
plying the "commonly accepted meaning of donation," the Board
had impermissibly revised HCFA's regulation.9 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit later affirmed the District Court's
judgment.1 °
At about the same time that HCFA challenged West Virginia's
funding mechanism, it also sought to disallow matching funds for
provider donations in Tennessee. Based upon the GAB's theory in
the West Virginia case, HCFA found that the donated funds con-
stituted a discount in claims and issued a disallowance totalling
$16.5 million. The GAB, however, declined to follow its West Vir-
ginia precedent. "[T]he circumstances here are clearly distinguish-
able from those considered in West Virginia. The transactions here
meet HCFA's regulation on its face." 1 The Board went on to note
that "HCFA may have had second thoughts about the wisdom of
the regulation; we, of course, are bound by it.' ' 2
Indeed, HCFA was having serious second thoughts about the
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1.
9. Lipscomb v. Bowen, 750 F. Supp. 197 (S.D. W.Va. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Miller v.
Hartman, 911 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1990).
10. Miller v. Hartman, 911 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished opinion, No. CA
87-333-2 (S.D. W.Va. June 28, 1989)).
11. Docket Nos. 88-137, 88-194, and 89-32, Decision No. 1047 (H.H.S. Departmen-
tal Appeals Board, Tenn. Department, May 4, 1989) at 2. Apparently, the fact that the
Tennessee hospital did not face massive unpaid Medicaid claims distinguished the two
cases.
12. Id.
19921
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wisdom of its rule. As more and more states sought federal
matching funds for provider donations and for taxes applied only
to providers, HCFA sought to revise its rule. On February 9,
1990, HCFA issued proposed regulations designed to discontinue
federal matching of provider funds. In the summary explaining
the change in policy, HCFA stated:
Due to recent program experience indicating the potential for use
of these revenues to affect unfairly the Federal share of Medicaid
expenditures, we are proposing to clarify the existing policy on
the use of donated funds by requiring the offset of revenues re-
ceived from donations from expenditures used to calculate the
Federal share of Medicaid payments. We are also proposing a
new policy providing for similar treatment of revenues derived
from taxes applied uniquely to providers.' 3
In justifying the proposed rule, HCFA cited the West Virginia
GAB and district court opinions.
Congress, however, was not prepared for such a change in pol-
icy. In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("OBRA
1989"),"4 Congress imposed a one-year moratorium on rule
making by HCFA with respect to voluntary contributions and pro-
vider taxes. The following year, in the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1990 ("OBRA 1990"),'" Congress extended the
moratorium on rule making through December 31, 1991. At the
same time, Congress took even stronger action to protect states'
ability to fund their state Medicaid program through taxes applied
uniquely to providers: nothing in this title "shall be construed as
authorizing the Secretary to deny or limit payments to a State for
expenditures, for medical assistance for items or services, attributa-
ble to taxes of general applicability imposed with respect to the
provision of such items or services."' 6 The provision on its face
seemed to prohibit HCFA from restricting in any way federal
matching payments for taxes levied on providers.
On October 31, 1991, HCFA published an interim final regula-
tion creatively construing the language of OBRA'90; the rule op-
posed broad restrictions on federal matching payments for
provider taxes.' 7 Not surprisingly, the rule also provided for the
13. 55 Fed. Reg. 4626 (1990) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 433).
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.A.).
15. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.A.).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(t) (West Supp. 1992).
17. The departure in policy was actually announced on September 12, 1991, with the
publication of an interim final regulation in the Federal Register. The September 12th
[Vol. I
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elimination of federal matching payments for provider donations at
the expiration of the Congressionally imposed moratorium on Jan-
uary 1, 1992.
Contrary to the clear language of OBRA 1990, the interim final
rule gave HCFA sweeping authority to deny FFP to states utilizing
provider taxes to fund their Medicaid programs. Under the terms
of the rule, FFP would be denied where a provider was "reim-
bursed" for the cost of a provider-specific tax. The rule explained
that HCFA would deem a provider "reimbursed" when a "cost-
reimbursed provider includes the cost of the tax on its cost report
as an allowable cost" or when a "provider paid on a prospective
basis includes the cost of the tax in its base year costs for payment
rate calculation" or when "[t]here is linkage between payment to
the provider and the tax program."' 8
The rule then proceeded to define the term "linkage" in such a
way as to give HCFA discretion to disallow FFP for provider-
specific taxes in virtually all cases.
[L]inkage is deemed to exist where any of the following condi-
tions is met:
- The payment to the provider paying the tax is related integrally
to the tax program. Examples of this integral relation would be
the dedicated use of the tax revenue in a special fund or account
to be used to enhance Medicaid payments from the State to the
provider paying the tax, or statements of legislative purpose in
State enabling legislation or other legislative history or evidence
establishing a linkage between the tax and Medicaid payments to
the provider paying the tax.
- A provider is "held harmless" for its tax payment by an effec-
tive guarantee that its enhanced Medicaid payment from the
State will at least cover the cost of the tax.
- The provider's tax payment is correlated significantly to the
State's Medicaid reimbursement or payment (including, for ex-
ample, disproportionate share hospital adjustments) to the
provider. 19
rule was then withdrawn and replaced with the October 31st version. "Because of misun-
derstandings created by certain portions of [the September 12 rule], we [HCFA] are pub-
lishing this interim final rule to withdraw and cancel it and to set forth a clearer interim
final rule on donations and taxes." 56 Fed. Reg. 56,132 (1991). It is arguable whether
the replacement rule is clearer than the original.
18. Id. at 56,137 (emphasis added).
19. Id. (emphasis added). Federal law requires states to make additional payments to
hospitals providing care to a disproportionate number of Medicaid and low income pa-
tients. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4 (West 1992 & Supp. 1992). States had been slow to com-
ply with this requirement, originally enacted in 1981. Many states used provider
donations and taxes as a way of financing these payments.
1992]
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As is obvious from the language of the rule, HCFA reserved for
itself virtually unlimited discretion to review state Medicaid
funding sources and deny FFP for provider-specific taxes it found
objectionable. HCFA did this all under the guise of interpreting
federal legislation designed to limit its intrusions into states'
funding of their Medicaid program.2"
The rule confirmed the worst fears of the states and intensified a
several-month-old game of "legislative chicken" between the states
and the Bush Administration. 2  The Administration intensified its
public relations efforts, branding states' programs as "scams and
schemes. '2 2 At the same time, the Administration also skillfully
utilized (manipulated) all of the budget tools at its disposal. OMB
redefined the budget baseline to include the proposed intermin final
rule. Thus, according to OMB, any Congressional legislative ac-
tion would be "scored" as a potential cost item. This dampened
Congress' desire to act since they would have to find offsetting
budget reductions in the Medicaid and Medicare programs.
Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) quickly moved to intro-
duce and mark-up legislation delaying the October 31st rule. The
legislation extended the moratorium on HCFA rule making
through September 30, 1992, and required the Secretary of Health
20. On the same day, HCFA also published a proposed rule limiting states' flexibility
in designating facilities as disproportionate share hospitals. The rule proposed to allow
states to designate as disproportionate share facilities only those hospitals with either a
(1) "Medicaid utilization percentage at or above the Statewide Medicaid utilization rate
arithmetic mean;" or (2) "low income utilization rate at or above the Statewide arithme-
tic mean low income utilization rate." 56 Fed. Reg. at 56,142 (1991). As justification for
this rule, HCFA stated:
At present, 38 States are either using, or planning to use, donation and tax
programs to obtain additional Federal funds. The most common form these
programs take is that States use hospital tax and donation revenues as the State
share of Medicaid expenditures to secure additional Federal funds. The pro-
vider tax amount is usually returned in the form of disproportionate share pay-
ments. States use the disproportionate share payments as the vehicle because
they are not subject to Medicare upper limits, and current policy permits flexi-
bility in how these payments are made. Therefore, States find it easy to struc-
ture payment formulas that can repay providers for their tax costs. Moreover,
by having expanded criteria for qualifying as a disproportionate share hospital,
States can use the rubric of disproportionate share hospital payments to repay
all hospitals in the State for participating in the tax and donation programs.
Id.
21. A draft of the interim final rules had been leaked in late July and, not unexpect-
edly, it created panic among the states. Pressure on the White House, the Office of Man-
agement and Budget ("OMB"), and HCFA was already intense by the time the first
version of the rule was published on September 12, 1991.
22. According to Administration officials, approximately 38 states had in place dona-
tions or tax programs at the time of these negotiations. Estimates of the federal payments
required to match donations and taxes varied wildly, from $5.5 to $12 billion.
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and Human Services to report to Congress, no later than February
3, 1992, regarding any intended regulation or legislation dealing
with provider-specific taxes. On November 19, 1991, the House
passed the legislation by an overwhelming margin.
Tension mounted as the Congressional session neared its close.
The Administration issued a threat or promise to veto the Wax-
man legislation and sharpened its rhetoric against states' programs.
The Administration publicly characterized as unacceptable a "one-
sided" moratorium that prevented HCFA from issuing rules, but
that allowed states to implement or expand donation and tax pro-
grams. The Administration also reiterated its intention to imple-
ment the October 31st regulation.
Negotiations between the Administration and the National Gov-
ernors' Association ("NGA") intensified,23 as did discussions be-
tween the Administration and Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX),
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. The pressure to com-
promise and avoid implementation of the October 31st rule was
intense. The day following the House vote, the Senate Finance
Committee reported legislation to the floor; it gutted the Waxman
legislation and replaced it with a "dual" moratorium, seeking to
lock the status quo in place. The legislation extended the morato-
rium on HCFA regulations to April 1, 1992. The Finance Com-
mittee version also created a moratorium on HCFA regulations
regarding payments to, or designation of, disproportionate share
hospitals. At the same time, it froze states' use of provider dona-
tions and taxes, and froze in place states' designation of, and pay-
ment levels for, disproportionate share hospitals. For obvious
reasons, those states without provider donation and tax programs
opposed the "dual" moratorium.
Meanwhile, fearing that the Administration would simply imple-
ment its October 31st rule, thereby eliminating providers as a
source of Medicaid funds, NGA staff agreed to compromise with
the Administration. Under Administration pressure, the Finance
Committee agreed to report, in addition to its substitute legislation,
the Administration/NGA "compromise" without recommenda-
tion. This action was taken notwithstanding the fact that the nego-
tiators had not reached final agreement and legislative language
embodying those principles upon which there was agreement had
not been fully drafted. Over the weekend of November 23rd, staff
23. For a discussion of the states' perspective on the negotiations, see Alicia Pelrine,
The Art of the Deal: Health Policy Making on the Fly, 2 J. AM. HEALTH POL'Y, May-
June 1992, at 23.
1992]
7
Spivey: Patching the Patchwork Quilt: "Reforming" the Medicaid Program -
Published by LAW eCommons, 1992
Annals of Health Law
worked feverishly to complete the compromise legislation. At the
same time, NGA staff and its Executive Committee worked to con-
vince the governors that this was the only viable alternative to the
October 31st regulations. The Administration met around the
clock with key senators, crafting language to protect, at least in the
short term, existing donation and tax programs and garner needed
political support. On November 26, the Senate, by voice vote,
passed the Administration/NGA compromise legislation. The fol-
lowing day, House and Senate conferees, with only minor modifi-
cations, agreed to the Senate version of the legislation. On the last
day of the session, both the house and senate quickly approved the
conference report. Two weeks later, with the President's signature,
the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax
Amendments of 199124 became law.
A COMPLEX SOLUTION TO AN AMBIGUOUS PROBLEM
The final legislation is sweeping in scope and complex in its reso-
lution of the disagreement between the states and the federal gov-
ernment. The legislation nullifies HCFA's October 31st interim
final rule, and in its place imposes limits on the amount and type of
provider taxes that will qualify for federal matching payments.
Equally significant, the legislation establishes a national limit on
payment adjustments to disproportionate share hospitals. Finally,
it eliminates federal matching payments for all but selected pro-
vider donations.
Provider Taxes
By far the most complicated provisions of the Act deal with fed-
eral matching payments for provider-specific taxes, or, in the lan-
guage of the Act, "health care related taxes." Federal matching
payments are available for provider-specific taxes only if the tax is
uniform, broad-based, and does not hold providers harmless for
the costs of the tax. The phrase "health care related tax" is defined
very broadly. It includes "any licensing fee, assessment or other
mandatory payment" 25 that "is related to health care items or serv-
ices, or to the provision of, the authority to provide, or payment for
[the health care] items or services."' 26 For taxes not limited to
health care providers, a tax is considered to be a health care related
24. Pub. L. No. 102-234, 105 Stat. 1793 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1396a & 1396b).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(w)(7)(F) (West Supp. 1992).
26. Id. at § 1396b(w)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992).
[Vol. I
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tax if at least 85 percent of the burden falls on health care provid-
ers. As a general rule, taxes do not include civil or criminal fines
or penalties.
In order to be considered "broad-based," a tax must be levied
"uniformly" on "all items or services" in a "class" of health care
items or services. In order to be uniform, a tax must meet one of
the following statutory criteria:
0 For licensing fees and similar taxes, the tax amount must be
the same for every provider within the class.
* For taxes or fees based upon a facility's number of beds, the
amount must be the same for each bed tax.
* For taxes based upon revenues or receipts, the tax must be im-
posed "at a uniform rate for all items or services (or providers of
such items or services) in the class [and be based] on all the gross
revenues or receipts, or net operating revenues, relating to the
provision of all such items or services [or providers]....
If one of these criteria is not met, a state may seek special HCFA
approval of its tax. The eight "classes" of items or services upon
which a tax must be levied are 1) inpatient hospital services, 2)
outpatient hospital services, 3) nursing facility services (other than
services of intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded), 4)
services of intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded, 5)
physicians' services, 6) home health care services, 7) outpatient
prescription drugs, and 8) services of health maintenance organiza-
tions.28 The statute provides that the Secretary may also designate
other classes by regulation.
States may exempt public hospitals (including state-owned hos-
pitals) and federal hospitals from a broad-based provider tax and
may apply to the Secretary for a waiver to exempt other classes of
hospitals such as rural hospitals or sole community hospitals.2 9
Federal matching payments are not available for a provider tax
where the state holds providers harmless for the costs of the tax. A
state is deemed to hold providers harmless for the costs of a tax if:
(A) [t]he State or other unit of government imposing the tax pro-
vides (directly or indirectly) for a payment (other than under this
subchapter) to taxpayers and the amount of such payment is pos-
itively correlated either to the amount of such tax or to the differ-
ence between the amount of the tax and the amount of payment
under the State plan.
(B) [a]ll or any portion of the payment made under this sub-
27. Id. at § 1396b(w)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(III).
28. Id. at § 1396b(w)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
29. Id. at § 1396b(w)(3)(E) (West Supp. 1992).
1992]
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chapter to the taxpayer varies based only upon the amount of the
total tax paid.
(C) [t]he State or other unit of government imposing the tax pro-
vides (directly or indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver
that guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the
costs of the tax.3
Finally, the statute places limits on the amount of state Medicaid
expenditures that can be financed by provider taxes. Revenues
from provider-specific taxes cannot exceed 25 percent of the state's
share of Medicaid expenditures or the state's "base percentage,"
whichever is greater. A state's base percentage equals the total
amount of provider donation and taxes projected to be collected in
state fiscal year 1992, divided by estimated non-federal Medicaid
expenditures in that year.3'
These provisions became effective on January 1, 1992, except for
certain states that were granted transition periods by the Act. For
those states with tax programs in effect at the time of passage of the
Act, the provisions become effective on either October 1, 1992,
January 1, 1993, or July 1, 1993, depending upon the beginning of
a state's fiscal year and/or next legislative session.
Provider Donations
As a general rule, the Act eliminates federal matching payments
for provider donations. FFP will continue for "bona fide" provider
donations, 32 that is, donations that have "no direct or indirect rela-
30. Id. at § 1396b(w)(4) (West Supp. 1992).
31. Id. at § 1396b(w)(5) (West Supp. 1992).
32. During the course of tussling over provider donations, the Administration raised
an additional issue - intergovernmental transfers of funds. Many commentators read
the September 12 version of the rule as restricting matching payments for local funds
transferred to state Medicaid programs. Local participation in the funding of the non-
federal share is contemplated by § 1902(a)(2) of the Social Security Act. The legislation
explicitly resolves this issue and requires HCFA to match intergovernmentally trans-
ferred funds:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the Secretary may not re-
strict States' use of funds where such funds are derived from State or local taxes
(or funds appropriated to State university teaching hospitals) transferred from
or certified by units of government within a State as the non-Federal share of
expenditures under this subchapter, regardless of whether the unit of govern-
ment is also a health care provider, except as provided in section 1396a(a)(2) of
this title, unless the transferred funds are derived by the unit of government
from donations or taxes that would not otherwise be recognized as the non-
Federal share under this section.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(w)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1992). The Act then goes on to require the
Secretary to utilize notice and comment rule making in order to change its policy with
respect to the matching of governmentally transferred funds.
[Vol. I
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tionship... to payments made under this subchapter to that pro-
vider, to providers furnishing the same class of items and services
as that provider, or to any related entity. . . . "33 The statute also
allows, in limited circumstances, for continued federal matching
payments for donations to fund eligibility workers. The transition
periods described above also apply to states with respect to the use
of non-bona fide provider donations.34
Disproportionate Share Payments
As significant as the legislation's restrictions on provider dona-
tions and taxes are the limitations on states' payments to facilities
serving disproportionate numbers of Medicaid and other low in-
come patients. 3- Beginning in 1981, Congress required states, in
developing hospital reimbursement rates, to consider hospitals that
serve a disproportionate number of Medicaid and low-income pa-
tients. Such so-called "disproportionate share hospital" ("DSH")
payments have been crucial to the survival of high volume Medi-
caid providers. The new legislation limits DSH payments.
In effect, the Act places a moratorium, at the outset, on DSH
spending. Prior to October 1, 1992, states may not increase DSH
payments. After October 1, 1992, the Act imposes a national ag-
gregate DSH payment limit as well as state specific limits. For
federal fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1992, the legislation im-
poses a nationwide aggregate cap on disproportionate share pay-
ments equal to 12 percent of the total amount of expenditures
(excluding expenditures for administrative costs) under state plans
for that year. Prior to the beginning of each federal fiscal year, the
Secretary will estimate national Medicaid expenditures and calcu-
late and publish the national limit. 36
The aggregate cap is then "allotted" to individual states. Each
state's allotment is calculated by first determining the state's "base
allotment." The base allotment is the greater of the "allowable"
DSH payments during federal fiscal year 1992 or $1 million.37 Al-
lowable DSH payments are defined as those 1) made pursuant to a
State Medicaid plan in effect or submitted to HCFA by September
30, 1991, or 2) made pursuant to a state law or regulations
adopted as of September 30, 1991.38
33. Id. at § 1396b(w)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
34. Id.
35. Id. at § 1396r-4.
36. Id. at § 1396r-4(f)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
37. Id. at § 1396r-4(f)(4)(C).
38. Id. at § 1396r-4(f)(1)(A)(i). These provisions also protect payments made pursu-
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In calculating these base allotments, HCFA first determines
whether a state is a "high" or a "low" DSH state. A "high" DSH
state is simply one whose federal fiscal year 1992 disproportionate
share payments exceed 12 percent of its expenditures for medical
assistance. 39 For high DSH states, the dollar amount of DSH pay-
ments in any fiscal year may not exceed the base allotment until
such time as the base allotment, as a percentage of Medicaid pay-
ments, is 12 percent or less. Thus, states currently spending above
the 12 percent limit on a state-specific basis are not forced to re-
duce disproportionate share payments. However, they may not ad-
just payments for inflation or otherwise increase payments until
such time as total state Medicaid spending increases to the point
where disproportionate share payments equal less than 12 percent
of total Medicaid spending. For all "low" DSH states, the base
allotment is adjusted annually by a "growth factor" and a "supple-
mental amount." Before the beginning of each federal fiscal year,
the Secretary calculates the national DSH limit by multiplying the
next fiscal year's estimated Medicaid expenditures by 12 percent.
From that amount, the Secretary subtracts the total of the previous
year's DSH allotments for both high and low DSH states; the Sec-
retary also subtracts the aggregate of states' "growth amounts." A
state's growth amount equals the product of the state's rate of in-
flation in its Medicaid program multiplied by the previous year's
allotment. After subtracting the base allotments and growth
amounts, any remaining amount, the so-called "redistribution
pool," is apportioned among the low DSH states based upon the
states' Medicaid expenditures as a percentage of the total of Medi-
caid expenditures by non-high DSH states.' °
The legislation prohibits HCFA from restricting a "State's au-
thority to designate hospitals as disproportionate share hospitals
.'- The flexibility enjoyed by states under current statutory
provisions is retained and the October 31st proposed rule gov-
erning states' designation of disproportionate share hospitals under
the Medicaid program is withdrawn and canceled.
The provisions of the new legislation are, in certain circum-
stances, "sunsetted." Beginning on or after January 1, 1996, the
DSH cap will not apply to a state if: 1) the state limits the number
ant to certain state plan amendments (and subsequent modifications) submitted between
October 1, 1991 and November 26, 1991.
39. Id. at § 1396r-4(f)(4)(A).
40. Id. at § 1396r-4(0(2).
41. Id. at § 1396r-4(b)(4) (West Supp. 1992).
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of hospitals that it designates as disproportionate share hospitals; 42
2) Congress has enacted legislation establishing federal standards
for DSH payments; and 3) the state chooses to follow the new fed-
eral standards.4 3
MANY QUESTIONS, FEW ANSWERS
Unfortunately, the Act creates as many questions as answers.
HCFA is left to try to interpret vague, ambiguous phrases in the
quickly-drafted legislation with little legislative history to guide its
decisions. Even under the best of circumstances, HCFA is unlikely
to issue regulations implementing the Act before early fall. States
are thus left to try to comply with the Act with no guidance from
HCFA.
With respect to provider taxes, HCFA faces not only difficult
questions regarding appropriate interpretations of such key con-
cepts as "uniformity" and "broad-based," but also faces fundamen-
tal questions regarding the very scope of the Act. For example,
what is a "health care related tax?" Is a property tax levied by
local governments with a rate uniquely applied to health care pro-
viders a health care related tax? Apparently this is not the type of
tax that HCFA was concerned with in negotiating the provisions
of the Act. Yet, the Act can be read in such a way as to implicate
this type of tax.
In attempting to define "uniformity," the Act becomes circular.
With respect to taxes on revenues or receipts, a tax is considered to
be imposed uniformly "if the tax is imposed at a uniform rate."
This apparently simple concept leads to a number of difficult ques-
tions. Can a state, for example, utilize a progressive or regressive
tax, one in which the tax rate varies according to levels of income?
Can a state exempt all income or revenues above or below a set
level?
Even more troublesome is the concept of "generally redistribu-
tive." Where a tax is not broad-based, the statute provides that a
state can obtain a waiver for the tax from HCFA if the state can
demonstrate that the tax is "generally redistributive." Redistribu-
42. Only hospitals meeting one of the following criteria could qualify as a DSH:
1) "[tlhe hospital's medicaid inpatient utilization rate... is at or above the mean medi-
caid inpatient utilization rate for all hospitals in the State"; 2) "[t]he hospital's low-
income utilization rate is at or above the mean low-income utilization rate for all hospi-
tals in the State"; or 3) "[tlhe number of inpatient days [for Medicaid-eligible patients] is
equal to at least 1 percent of the total number of such days for all hospitals in the State."
Id. at § 1396r-4(f)(1)(D).
43. Id.
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tive from whom to whom? And how redistributive is "generally"
redistributive?
Similarly, a state must demonstrate that there is no "payment,
offset, or waiver that guarantees to hold taxpayors harmless for any
portion of the costs of [a provider] tax."" The Act does not ex-
plain what constitutes a "guarantee." Does this provision preclude
any improvement in reimbursement rates for providers subject to
the tax? The Act seems to allow for such improvement in reim-
bursement rates, but it is less than clear in its treatment of this
subject.
All of these questions will have to be addressed as HCFA at-
tempts to implement the Act; all of them will have to be answered
with little guidance from Congress.
CONCLUSION
There is, without doubt, some merit to the Administration's
claim that states used provider donations and taxes to "unfairly
affect" the federal share of Medicaid expenditures. In some cases,
states displaced state general revenue funds with provider funds.
In others, states "borrowed" provider funds, leveraged federal
matching funds, returned the donations or taxes to providers, and
kept the federal matching payments for itself.
The states no doubt relished this ability. For years, states had
complained about federal mandates to expand Medicaid coverage
or services. The year before the passage of this Act, the NGA had
adopted a resolution opposing further mandates. States had seen
their Medicaid budgets hemorrhage, with little concern from
Washington. Through the use of provider donations and taxes,
states had found a way to stop this hemorrhaging; they passed the
expense back to Washington.
The Act put a (temporary) end to this skirmishing. The Admin-
istration regained some budget predictability with limits on growth
of state Medicaid spending, and states protected the ability to use
donations and taxes in certain circumstances. Yet, one is left with
the question: while this legislation has resolved the current dispute
between the federal government and the states, how has it im-
proved access to or quality of care to indigent patients? Has it
addressed the fundamental problems in the Medicaid program?
The obvious answer to these questions is no. The vast majority of
federal funds generated by provider donations and taxes were used
44. Id. at § 1396b(w)(4) (emphasis added).
[Vol. I
14
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 1 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol1/iss1/4
"Reforming" the Medicaid Program
to improve access to care by indigent patients and expand services
or increase payments to hospitals serving the indigent. Even still,
approximately 37 million Americans have no health care coverage,
and Medicaid providers have been and continue to be notoriously
underpaid for their care to indigent patients (notwithstanding the
Boren Amendment). 45 Perhaps states had found a way to "un-
fairly affect" federal matching rates, but such measures were
prompted by the failure of the Administration and Congress to en-
gage in meaningful health care reform. Obviously, the statute does
nothing to address these fundamental problems.
The states have attempted to protect the status quo and to retain
some ability to use provider donations and taxes to fund Medicaid
expenditures. In time, the pressures that led to their creative use of
these funding mechanisms will build again, and states will have few
alternatives to respond to these pressures. In the end, they will be
left with no choice but to cut reimbursement to providers, reduce
program services, or restrict eligibility. None of these alternatives
is attractive or acceptable.
The simple fact is that the Medicaid program is irreparably bro-
ken. The Act is simply another patch to the patch-work quilt
called Medicaid, but it does nothing to improve the long term via-
bility of the program or address the health care crisis facing this
country. The Medicaid program must be replaced. Hopefully that
will be done sooner rather than later, but it will be done, because it
must be done.
45. The Boren Amendment requires states to pay providers. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1992). (Medicare and Medicaid Amendments of 1980, tit. X, Pub. L.
No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2609).
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